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ARTICLE
SELF-DECEPTION AND THE PURSUIT OF
ETHICAL PRACTICE: CHALLENGES FACED
BY LARGE LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL
KIMBERLY KIRKLAND*
INTRODUCTION
In 2007 and 2008, I interviewed general counsel at some of the largest
law firms in the United States.1 I was investigating how general counsel
conceive of and approach their roles and examining the assumptions and
beliefs that frame their decision-making. In the course of my interviews,
many general counsel expressed what appeared to me on rereading the tran-
scripts to be internally inconsistent or dissonant views about the ethics of
lawyers in their firms. On the one hand, general counsel told me lawyers in
their firms “want to do the right thing” and conduct themselves within an
ethical range the general counsel were comfortable with.2 On the other
hand, the vast majority of general counsel I interviewed reported that they
kept a mental list of lawyers in the firm who, among other things, spin,
shade, and omit relevant facts in conversations with general counsel about
potential conflicts of interest.3 There was no question that the lawyers on
the list knew that accurate facts about the scope of a past, or current repre-
sentation on the one hand, and of the proposed representation on the other
* Kimberly Kirkland is Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Research at the
University of New Hampshire School of Law.  I am grateful for the thoughtful comments and
continuing support of my colleagues Chris Johnson, Dana Remus, and Amy Vorenberg through-
out my work on this project.  They make exploring ideas a joy. Finally, I thank UNH School of
Law for its support of this work.
1. Some of the findings of that study are reported in Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastruc-
tures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work in Large U.S. Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel,
11 LEGAL ETHICS 181 (2009).
2. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, at 37–38 (2007–2008) (on file with author); Inter-
view with General Counsel No. 6, at 20 (2007–2008) (on file with author). When citing my data I
employ a coding system to protect the identities of the lawyers I interviewed and their firms. I
assigned each general counsel I interviewed a number (e.g., Interview with General Counsel No.
1, Interview with General Counsel No. 2, etc.). Where I quoted general counsel, I refer to him or
her by number and cite the page of the number of the interview transcript where the quotation is
found.
3. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 45–47.
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hand, are essential to determining whether a conflict exists. Thus, the con-
duct the general counsel described sounded ethically problematic to me, yet
most general counsel did not seem to view the lawyers on the list as unethi-
cal. Further, although many general counsel appeared to view character
flaws as a primary cause of lawyer misconduct, they did not view the list-
lawyers’ conduct as an indication of nascent character flaws.
General counsels’ views of the lawyers on the list were particularly
striking given the roles general counsel have assumed in large law firms.
The general counsel I interviewed are among the large firm lawyers most
consciously committed to ethical practice. They have spent years becoming
experts in the ethical rules (an activity which typically does not generate
immediate or direct financial rewards and therefore bespeaks a significant
level of interest and commitment to ethics). They talk regularly both within
and outside their firms about the ethical rules governing lawyers, something
many lawyers rarely think or talk about. Moreover, the general counsel I
interviewed spend time pondering about how and why lawyers get involved
in unethical conduct and about how firms might prevent this. The general
counsel I met care deeply about acting ethically, and many serve as exem-
plars of ethical lawyering within their firms. And yet, they did not charac-
terize their partners’ spinning, shading, and omitting relevant facts as lying
or intentionally deceiving, notwithstanding that these partners know that
those facts are relevant to determining whether the firm is complying with
the ethics rules. Why not?
Were the general counsel I interviewed avoiding acknowledging an
unpleasant truth about some of their colleagues or was my perception—the
perception that the conduct of the lawyers on the list was ethically question-
able—inaccurate? Was I judging the list-lawyers’ conduct according to or-
dinary morality when a different set of norms should apply, or were general
counsel rationalizing conduct that was unethical even under the generally
accepted norms of the profession? These questions raise what Professor
Elizabeth Chambliss has dubbed “the benchmark problem” in the empirical
study of legal ethics.4
Chambliss argues that the two prevailing theories framing legal ethics
research and analysis are “ethical fading theory”5 and “ethical learning the-
ory.”6 Ethical fading theory is grounded in cognitive psychology. The term
“ethical fading” describes the process by which good people engage in a
4. Elizabeth Chambliss, Whose Ethics? The Benchmark Problem in Legal Ethics Research,
in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 47 (Leslie Levin & Lynn
Mather eds., forthcoming 2012); see also Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fad-
ing: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 228 (2004); John
M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2005).
5. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 49–52; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 224.
6. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 52–55.
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variety of forms of self-deception,7 which allows the ethical and moral
dimensions of their decisions and actions to fade. Conduct that at one time
might have seemed unethical or immoral loses its ethical and moral salience
over time as lawyers become enmeshed in specialized work groups. In
those groups the norms-in-use typically vary from generally accepted ethi-
cal and moral norms and sometimes from the norms of other specialties
within the profession. Ethical learning theory posits that acting ethically as
a lawyer requires a process of professional socialization and training in a set
of professional norms that are, in some cases, appropriately contrary to or-
dinary morality. These professional norms—some grounded in regulations,
some developed informally through communities of practice and workplace
practice groups—are quite specialized and often require expertise to under-
stand. As a result, ethical learning theory suggests lawyers’ ethics must be
evaluated in the context of lawyering in an adversarial system generally as
well as in light of the lawyers’ practice-specific context. Thus, what appears
to an outsider to be an example of ethical fading might in fact represent
ethical learning. Because the outsider lacks knowledge and expertise of the
practice of law and practice within a particular specialty and organizational
setting, he evaluates the conduct at issue from a different normative bench-
mark—one not appropriate to the context. Accordingly, Chambliss argues
that empirical legal research “requires a rigorous separation between empir-
ical and normative claims . . . , [which], in turn, requires the systematic
specification of normative benchmarks in research.”8
My findings provide an opportunity to separate empirical and norma-
tive claims and to compare the varying narratives generated when we ex-
amine the data first through the lens of ethical learning theory and then
through the lens of ethical fading theory. This comparative methodology
allows the reader and me to identify, test, and evaluate whether the norms
each theory posits are the appropriate starting points for evaluating lawyers’
ethics. I begin in Part II by describing my methodology. In Part III, I pre-
sent my empirical findings about the list-lawyers’ conduct and general
counsel’s views of their conduct. As I report these findings, I note several
demographic and structural variables that may affect general counsel’s per-
ceptions of list-lawyers’ ethics and the causes of lawyer misconduct. For
instance, I identify differences in the views of general counsel who have
worked in their firms for the majority of their careers (“homegrown general
7. Herbert Fingarette describes a person engaged in self-deception as:
a person of whom it is a patent characteristic that even when normally appropriate he
persistently avoids spelling-out some feature of his engagement in the world. Sometimes
we see this as an “inability” to spell-out: The self-deceiver is “unable” to admit the truth
to himself (even though he knows in his heart it’s so). There is a kind of genuineness to
his “ignoring”; it is not simple hypocrisy, or lying, or dumping of others.  Yet we feel
that in some sense he could admit the truth only if he would.
HERBERT FINGARETTE, SELF-DECEPTION 46 (2000); see also Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4,
at 224.
8. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 55.
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counsel”) and the views of several general counsel who came to their posi-
tions from outside their firms (“outsider general counsel”). I also note com-
monalities and differences in the reports of general counsel who work in
firms with “lock-step” or “modified lock-step” compensation systems9 and
those general counsel who work in firms that employ more competitive
compensation systems. A number of variations in responses appear to corre-
late (although the sample are far too small to draw any firm conclusions)
with these structural differences in what otherwise is a largely homogene-
ous group of subjects.
In Part III, I offer alternative theoretical interpretations of the data for
the purpose of providing readers with a basis for drawing their own conclu-
sions and making judgments about general counsel’s perceptions and nor-
mative claims.  Accordingly, I analyze my data first through the lens of
ethical fading theory and then through the lens of ethical learning theory.
Through that process I develop two distinct narratives about large firm gen-
eral counsel’s views about the list-lawyers’ conduct. In so doing, I strive to
capture the nuances and complexities of one aspect of large firm general
counsel’s ethical world-views. First, I examine general counsel’s descrip-
tions of the lawyers on their lists. I ask whether the language general coun-
sel use in their descriptions: (1) reflects and enables a process of ethical
fading; or (2) is an indication of ethical learning that requires the adoption
of a context-specific set of ethical benchmarks appropriate to the competi-
tive internal world of large law firm practice. I then investigate the role of
personal relationships and compensation systems in the adoption of one
narrative over the other. Specifically, I examine my data to determine
whether there are differences in homegrown general counsel and outsider
general counsel’s views of the list lawyers and for differences in the views
of general counsel in firms with lock-step or modified lock-step compensa-
tion systems from those working in firms with competitive compensation
systems. From this foundation, readers can assess for themselves whether
general counsel’s perceptions represent ethical fading or ethical learning or
some combination of the two.
I describe the methodology I employed in my 2007 through 2008 study
of general counsel below.10
I. METHODOLOGY
My study of general counsel in large U.S. law firms consisted of semi-
structured interviews with eighteen lawyers working in seventeen large law
9. See Paul C. Saunders, When Compensation Creates Culture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
295, 295 (2006) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER (2004) (characterizing the lock-step model as a system where partners of equal
seniority are compensated equally regardless of their performance in the firm)).
10. Kirkland, supra note 1, at 186–88; Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The
Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 659–62 (2005).
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firms. At the time of my interviews, sixteen of those lawyers currently or
previously served as general counsel for their firms. Two of the lawyers I
interviewed were conflicts directors11 in their firms and worked for their
firms’ general counsel. Firms structure the general counsel role in a wide
variety of ways. Six of the sixteen general counsel I interviewed held the
title general counsel. Two of those lawyers shared the general counsel posi-
tion and title with another lawyer in their firms. The titles given to the
lawyer or lawyers charged with the responsibility of resolving ethics ques-
tions in the remaining firms varied widely. All made some reference to
ethics, professional responsibility, or professionalism in the title.
For fourteen of the sixteen general counsel I interviewed, the general
counsel job is part-time, meaning the lawyer serving in that role carried on
a law practice as well. Two of the general counsel interviewed worked full-
time in that role. A number of the firms employing a part-time model utilize
a committee to fulfill the general counsel’s duties, so the ethics responsibili-
ties are shared among a small group of lawyers.
I conducted all of my semi-structured interviews in person, spending
from one to two and a half hours with each lawyer. The interviews took
place in four cities on the east and west coasts of the United States. I con-
ducted an additional phone interview with one of the eighteen lawyers. Of
the lawyers I interviewed, five were women and thirteen were men. All
were Caucasian-Americans.
The eighteen lawyers I interviewed were not chosen at random. In-
stead, I used personal connections to gain access to the general counsel I
interviewed. I was introduced to most of them by colleagues. I met several
at conferences and asked if they might let me interview them. All of the
lawyers I interviewed spoke with me on the condition that they and their
firms not be identified.
The seventeen law firms range in size from approximately 350 to over
a thousand lawyers, and all have multiple offices. Sixteen of the seventeen
firms are “ranked” in the American Lawyer 100 rankings.12 According to
the American Lawyer’s 2007 rankings, nine of the firms were among the
11. Both conflicts directors I interviewed reported to an ethics counsel. They both were re-
sponsible for overseeing the conflicts system and handled many conflicts issues themselves. When
confronted with particularly difficult conflicts issues or a partner was upset about their advice,
they referred the issue to ethics counsel. Both conflicts directors supervised the non-professional
personnel on the conflicts staff. In addition, both conducted legal research for ethics counsel.
A conflicts director is a person in a law firm who is charged with the responsibility of ensur-
ing that the firm is not engaged in representing individuals or organizations that may be mutually
corrupting, which may place the firm and its lawyers in jeopardy of violating ethics rules or
committing malpractice.
12. The American Lawyer is a monthly magazine for lawyers. It covers the business of the
largest and most successful law firms in the United States. Each year The American Lawyer pub-
lishes firm rankings, which include ranking by gross revenues per lawyer, profits per partner,
associate satisfaction, and hours committed to pro bono work.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST212.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-DEC-12 10:37
598 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2
fifty highest revenue-generating firms in the country, and ten had among
the fifty highest reported profits per partner in the country.13
All but two of the general counsel I interviewed were partners in their
firms. The two general counsel who were not partners both held the title
“General Counsel.” One was a former partner in the firm who had resigned
her partnership, and the other was hired from the outside. Neither of the
conflicts directors I interviewed were partners. A number of the general
counsel interviewed were rainmakers14 in their firms. All but one were or
had been litigators when they practiced law.
Of the sixteen general counsel I interviewed, all but four were “home-
grown,” meaning they had “grown up” in their firms. They began work in
their firms as associates and were promoted to partner. Of the four general
counsel who were not entirely homegrown, two were partially homegrown.
One had practiced at his firm for a short while, left for many years to work
elsewhere, and then returned to the firm as general counsel. The other had
practiced elsewhere for a number of years and lateralled15 into his firm as
an associate. This general counsel was made partner and assumed the role
of general counsel thereafter. The other two non-homegrown general coun-
sel were outsiders. One had practiced in other firms and had served as gen-
eral counsel in another firm before he was hired as general counsel at his
firm. The other had worked in the corporate world before he joined his firm.
One of the conflicts directors had worked as an associate at the firm
before taking on the role of conflicts director. The other was hired from
outside the firm.
II. LARGE FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE ETHICS OF
THE LAWYERS IN THEIR FIRMS—“THE LIST”
I asked all of the general counsel I interviewed about their perceptions
of the ethics of the lawyers in their firms. At some point, in this line of
questioning the homegrown general counsel expressed a general confidence
in the ethics of their colleagues. They described their colleagues as people
who generally try to “do the right thing.” One general counsel said:
I think all of my partners want to do the right thing and don’t
want to get into trouble. It’s unpleasant being the subject of sanc-
tions motions, disciplinary proceedings, and DQ motions. You
watch someone else go through it and you know it’s not pleasant.
I went through it once on a ridiculous claim, but the judge held a
13. See The Am Law 100 2007, AM. LAW., May 2007, at 125, 153–58. These data are self-
reported.
14. The term “rainmaker” is used in large U.S. law firms to refer to a lawyer who generates
substantial business for the firm (i.e., the lawyer brings in enough client work to keep himself and
numerous other lawyers in the firm busy).
15. This is a term used in the legal profession to refer to experienced lawyers who move from
a position in a firm or government office to a similar position in another firm.
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hearing on sanctions—it drives you crazy that you may have put
your firm and your client in harm’s way. . . . Everyone here wants
to do the right thing—they don’t want to be “the one.”16
Another described the ethics of the lawyers in his firm as falling within
a range he was comfortable with:
There is a spectrum of approaches among people. I think here
they’re all within a range I’m pretty comfortable with.  Am I sure
there aren’t people taking on matters I wouldn’t take?  No, but I
haven’t seen things that make my hair curl.17
At the same time, the general counsel from firms with competitive
compensation systems indicated that some lawyers in their firms raise
greater ethics concerns than others.18 The first general counsel who men-
tioned keeping a mental list of lawyers who posed greater ethical concerns
was an outsider general counsel who had served as general counsel at an-
other firm before moving to his current firm. He explained, “You need to
keep a mental book on who you’re dealing with.”19
One of the homegrown general counsel described the lawyers in his
firm about whom he had concerns as “the lawyers people joke about.”
There are those lawyers people joke about—who people say “he’s
never seen a conflict in his life.” These are the lawyers with a
very narrow view of what a conflict is.  Yes there are some—
there are definitely some who are more of a concern. . . . These
lawyers, the lawyers people joke about, they will push and want
to take on the matter and need to be talked back from taking
something on.20
Similarly, another homegrown general counsel reported that he kept a
“watch list” of problem lawyers:
Question: Are there lawyers within the firm who you worry
about with respect to ethics?
Yes, you have a “watch list.”21
I asked this same general counsel what put a lawyer on the “watch
list.”
Question: How does someone end up on the “watch list”?
How do you identify the people you need to watch?
You look at what is the nature of the questions they ask. What is
the nature of the push back they give you? What’s their attitude
toward ethics issues? Is it an inconvenience or are they trying to
16. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 37–38.
17. Interview with General Counsel No. 6, supra note 2, at 20.
18. Two general counsel were not forthcoming about their firms’ compensation systems. Of
these two, one did not comment about whether he had a list; the other acknowledged that he kept a
list.
19. Interview with General Counsel No. 7, at 2 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
20. Interview with General Counsel No. 6, supra note 2, at 19.
21. Interview with General Counsel No. 3, at 25 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
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comply? Is their response—“that’s a stupid rule” or “I don’t want
to”? If that kind of attitude comes repeatedly, I know I have
someone who views the rules as impediments to their practice.
That’s how someone gets on the “watch list.” And I’m generally
right. When I trace back the malpractice suits or ethics issues
there are not a lot of surprises. They are often people on my
“watch list.”22
Another homegrown general counsel described the characteristics or
conduct that put a lawyer on his list this way:
Question: Do you have a mental list of lawyers within the firm
you watch out for?
Yes, and anyone who tells you he/she doesn’t is lying.
Question: Who goes on the list—what qualities or conduct
lands someone on the list?
[It’s a] mental list—it takes time to develop. But you know who is
going to tell you all the facts over time. You know who is more
possessive and territorial over time and you work with them.23
This became a common theme in my interviews. Both homegrown and
outsider general counsel in firms that employed competitive compensation
systems repeatedly identified the nature of a lawyer’s representation of facts
in a discussion about a potential conflict of interest as an indication that a
lawyer belonged on the list of lawyers who needed to be handled differ-
ently. Determining whether a proposed representation creates a conflict of
interest is a central function of large firm general counsel’s job and is vi-
tally important to the firm. Facts are essential in determining whether a
proposed representation of a new client presents a conflict of interest with
the firm’s representation of a current or former client. General counsel rou-
tinely gather facts about the scope of the firms’ past or current representa-
tion of a client and the proposed representation of a new client or a new
matter for an existing client. Consistently, the conduct general counsel cited
as raising concerns about lawyers ethics related to lawyers’ truthfulness
in this fact-gathering process. One general counsel’s comments are
representative:
The people I put in that category are people who haven’t been
truthful to me.  I put them in a category I’m going to watch more
carefully.  I don’t tend to get that kind of information [informa-
tion that would put a lawyer in the “watch more carefully” cate-
gory] from other people.  It’s usually based on my experience.
Question: Can you describe the kind of situations where a
lawyer has not been truthful with you and you’ve put them in
the “watch more carefully” category?
22. Id.
23. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 44 (emphasis added).
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[I’m] not told the basic correct information about what the new
representation will be, or what the old one [representation] was.  I
don’t usually run across it [untruthfulness] with PR issues [as op-
posed to new business issues, i.e., conflicts issues.]24
The outsider general counsel who first mentioned that he maintained a
mental list of lawyers he needed to watch more closely reported similar
experiences:
I have to be able to have a mental book on each person I deal
with. If I’m talking to a person I know is in a [“can’t trust”]
box—he’ll tell me this, but I have to ask him questions. [If you]
push on someone—[and if the] facts aren’t what someone told
me. . . . If you find yourself wrestling with guys, you know you
need to be careful about this person.
Question: What kind of facts are you talking about?
The description of the work we might want to do for a new cli-
ent—[he might] rephrase the nature of what’s being brought in.
Or [he might rephrase the lawyers’] statement of work that’s
come in, that the firm has [already] done.25
General counsel reported that they had developed strategies for uncov-
ering the truth about the facts in sorting out potential conflicts of interest.
Several reported putting multiple lawyers with knowledge of the representa-
tion in the same room to create a check on the problem-lawyers’ account of
the facts: “Getting everyone involved with the client in question in the same
room diminishes the chances that there is a spin or shading of the
presentation.”26
Another general counsel reported using similar tactics to try to get all
of the facts relevant to the determination of whether a conflict exists:
There are times when I feel it’s important to get both partners on
the phone because if I talk to them individually both present a set
of facts to try to convince me that they are right, so often I ar-
range that. These lawyers are generally advocates and they are
pretty good at it—they are interested either in minimizing or
heightening the conflicts.27
The outsider general counsel expressed the view that it is helpful that
many general counsel have litigation skills when dealing with these situa-
tions. He explained that litigators are skeptics and are good at pressing peo-
ple on the facts. He described a situation in which he used his litigation
skills to uncover the truth when a conflict issue arose with a prospective
lateral hire whose firm represented a client who was adverse to a current
client of the general counsel’s firm:
24. Interview with General Counsel No. 2, at 29 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
25. Interview with General Counsel No. 7, supra note 19, at 6–7.
26. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 45.
27. Interview with General Counsel No. 6, supra note 2, at 11.
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I said, “let me talk to him.” I’ve taken depositions—[I’m] good at
asking questions. A twenty-minute conversation reveals [the] lat-
eral is totally under-selling his role with clients. At the end [of the
conversation], the [prospective lateral] says, “I guess this kills the
lateral move.” I tell him, “Yes, unless we get big waivers.”28
Another general counsel reported doing independent research to inves-
tigate the facts:
Question: Do you do anything differently with a person
you’re concerned about?
I do a lot by email anyway because I have a package on new
matters and I want a record if I’m hit by a bus—I don’t want them
saying “Why did he clear this?”  I make sure people tell me what
they’re telling me in writing.  Remember it’s a weapon.  If it
doesn’t sound right to me, I’ll do my own looking around.  We
have the ability to search through the document management sys-
tem.  You’d be amazed what you’ll find that way.29
Several general counsel also reported putting a number of lawyers in
the same room to provide a check on a problem-partner’s reluctance to im-
plement the firm’s resolution of a conflict issue. One general counsel
explained:
[I]f you need a waiver, how you ask the client can often deter-
mine whether the waiver will be forthcoming—I know if the firm
has determined it’s appropriate to seek a waiver—we need to
make a genuine effort to get one. I don’t think they are being
dishonorable but if [the partners on the list] present the proposal,
the enthusiasm won’t be there. So I say, “I’d like so-and-so on the
phone with you.” The partner in question will be more enthusias-
tic if so-and-so is on the phone or so-and-so will be more
enthusiastic.30
In contrast, when they are dealing with lawyers whose ethics they
trust, a number of general counsel reported that they are far less aggressive
in pursuing the facts.
One general counsel described his conversations about conflicts with a
lawyer whom he trusted:
Yes, you keep a mental list—[But] [t]here are some people who
are really good on these issues—[David Jones] on the Executive
Committee for instance.  He’ll say “here’s what I want to do,” I
may kick the tires a little bit, but I’ll say go ahead because I know
he’s conservative on these things; he will disclose when he
should, he will get a waiver when he should . . . .31
28. Interview with General Counsel No. 7, supra note 19, at 9.
29. Interview with General Counsel No. 2, supra note 24, at 29–30.
30. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 45.
31. Interview with General Counsel No. 11, at 18 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
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This general counsel indicated that he asked more questions of part-
ners on the list.32
Despite their acknowledgement that lawyers spin, shade, and even
omit relevant facts and despite the fact that they have to use litigation-like
strategies to uncover the facts when dealing with list lawyers, none of the
homegrown general counsel I interviewed described or seemed to view
their colleagues’ representation of facts as intentional misrepresentations or
lying. One general counsel’s comments are indicative of the homegrown
general counsel’s seemingly dissonant views about the lawyers on their
lists:
I’ve never known any of my partners to lie to me. Have they
omitted relevant information later adduced by my questions? Yes.
(pause) Anyone who tells you there is no “list” is lying.33
Later this same general counsel said:
I really don’t think any partner would lie to me about a matter
involving the firm’s interest because it’s their firm too.  I don’t
think they’d lie to anybody about the facts and circumstances.
People exaggerate the extent of the impact.  There are some part-
ners who are better citizens than others. . . . I say if a sentence
starts “clearly” it’s not going to be clear.  It’s the same thing—If a
partner says, “you know I’m a good citizen,” I’ll bet you dollars
to donuts he’s not in the top ten.34
In contrast, one of the two outsider general counsel I interviewed did
appear to view some of the lawyers in his former firm as unethical:
I’d sit in meetings and think, the most important thing is to have a
strong sense of right and wrong. These [partners’] powers of per-
suasion are highly refined: you find yourself listening to them and
going along and then you have to stop and say “but A, B, C, and
D.” There’s no substitute for common sense and a strong sense of
right and wrong.  The smartest people think they can get away
with things—I would never trade a strong sense of integrity and
character for intelligence with no center.35
Later, this same outsider general counsel said:
Especially at the big firms, the top echelon is full of super
type-A personalities.  They are very smart, very smart in clever
ways. You’d think at a law firm you’d be in a place that would
respect the rule of law but they’re too smart for that.
I would do investigations [investigating the facts to try to
determine the scope of representation for purposes of determining
whether a conflict existed]. They know the relevant questions;
32. Id. at 19.
33. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 16.
34. Id. at 45–47.
35. Interview with General Counsel No. 10, at 2 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
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they know where you’re headed so they give partial answers. It’s
hard to pin them down on the facts.  They are skilled at presenting
the facts in the light most favorable to what they want.36
In other words, this outsider general counsel viewed partners’ omitting
facts or persuasive representation of the facts as an indication that these
lawyers did not respect the rule of law. Moreover, his comments suggest
that he viewed some of the large law firm partners he worked with as lack-
ing integrity and/or character.
The other outsider general counsel categorized the types of people you
find in a large law firm:
[There are a variety of types of lawyers at every firm]:
[Some] might be nice honest people—[the kind of] person you
trust to care for your children—but they just don’t get ethics.
[You] also see cunning, shrewd, crafty, canny people who know
exactly where blank rule is and stay one step inside.  They go to
the edge of the cliff and don’t step off.  These are people you’d
never leave your kids with, but they don’t get into ethics trouble.
[Then] there are other people who say, “I can get away with that
once.” They’re often right. It’s true. Sometimes you can get away
with it two times, but you can’t make a career of it. [It’s] amazing
how many suits against firms don’t arise organically [i.e., as a
direct consequence of a lawyer’s violation of rules]. Usually it’s
other lawyers or clients who have the incentive to poke around
and look for a problem.  They go looking for the vulnerability.
You have to assume you could get caught.37
Thus, this outsider general counsel believes some lawyers within large
law firms intentionally violate rules.
In stark contrast, notwithstanding their common experience with law-
yers shading, spinning, and omitting relevant facts and, thus, the need to
keep “the list,” homegrown general counsel generally expressed confidence
in the ethics of the lawyers in their firms. Moreover, they did not character-
ize the list-lawyers’ conduct as lying or as intentionally misleading and did
not appear to view these lawyers as lacking integrity.
III. ETHICAL FADING OR DIFFERENT NORMATIVE BENCHMARKS?
So what do we make of large law firm general counsel’s perceptions of
the ethics of the lawyers in their firms? General counsel working in firms
with competitive compensation systems report that there are lawyers in
their firms who spin, shade, and omit relevant information when describing
current or prospective representations to the general counsel in discussions
about conflicts. The homegrown general counsel within this cohort do not
appear to view this conduct as lying or as an indication that these lawyers’
36. Id. at 2.
37. Interview with General Counsel No. 7, supra note 19, at 2.
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ethics are outside an acceptable range. Although most partners in large law
firms are not well versed in the details of the conflicts rules, there is no
question that they are aware that in order to determine whether a conflict
exists, the general counsel needs an accurate and complete understanding of
the scope of the prior or existing representation and of the proposed repre-
sentation. In other words, large law firm partners know why the general
counsel asks the questions he asks. Most lay people would view someone
who knows (1) why he is being asked to provide certain facts, (2) why
accurate information is important, and (3) responds by providing less than
all of the relevant facts and/or who tries to color the presentation of the
facts, as deliberately misleading if not lying. And at least one of the outsider
general counsel seemed to view the list lawyers as lacking integrity.
Is the fact that homegrown general counsel do not view the list-law-
yers’ conduct as lying an indication that they are deceiving themselves and
thus that they are, in fact, experiencing ethical fading?  Alternatively, are
they operating from a different set of normative benchmarks? In other
words, do they work from a different set of ethical norms than do lay peo-
ple—a set of norms that is entirely appropriate to the context of their work?
Or might there be some truth in both of these options? I explore these ques-
tions below.
A. Ethical Fading Theory—Language Euphemisms
Cognitive psychologists Ann Tenbrunsel and  David Messick argue
that several enablers of self-deception, including language euphemisms,
slippery slope decision-making, and errors in perceptual causation, allow an
actor to avoid recognizing the full ethical implications of his decision.38
Language euphemisms, slippery slope decision-making, and errors in
perceptual causation can serve to encourage unethical behavior by allowing
us to frame a decision as something other than an ethical decision. Tenbrun-
sel and Messick explain:
[S]elf-deception leads to coding, or framing, of decisions that ei-
ther eliminate negative ethical characterizations or distort them
into positive ones.  Self-deception helps to disguise violations of
our ethical principles.  If we do not see that our actions are uneth-
ical, then we can behave in a self-interested but ultimately unethi-
cal manner.  In other words, we don’t code the decision as an
unethical one; rather, we see it as ethically colorless. The decision
is categorized in other terms, perhaps as a business, economic,
personal, or legal decision. Such categorization in turn allows be-
havior that others would judge as unethical.39
38. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 225.
39. Id. at 231–32.
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Tenbrunsel and Messick explain how language euphemisms can serve
as one of the enablers of self-deception:
Language euphemisms are the “disguised” stories we tell our-
selves about our unethical actions. These stories are an edited ver-
sion of the “real” story, devoid of all ethical implications.
Through renaming actions we take and relabeling decisions we
make, we turn what may be unacceptable into socially approved
behaviors. Euphemistic language can make harmful conduct re-
spectable and [is therefore] an “injurious” weapon.40
For example, accountants sometimes refer to illegal accounting prac-
tices as “aggressive” or “creative” accounting; the military speaks of “col-
lateral damage” rather than civilian casualties; businesses describe layoffs
as “right sizing.”41 Tenbrunsel and Messick note that language euphemisms
serve to describe conduct in an ethically neutral way and, in some circum-
stances (such as the term “right sizing”), may also serve to justify the ac-
tion.42 In this way, language euphemisms allow us to avoid acknowledging
or reflecting on the ethical implications of our actions.
When general counsel describe the partners on their lists as spinning
and shading the facts, ethical fading theory would argue they are using lan-
guage euphemisms, which allow them to avoid the ethical implications of
the list-lawyers’ intentionally misleading statements. Describing these law-
yers as “good advocates” serves both to reduce the ethical salience of their
conduct and to justify the conduct as an aspect of big firm lawyering, not-
withstanding that when they discuss conflicts issues with their general
counsel, the lawyers on the list are not acting as advocates for a client in an
adversarial process. Rather, they are acting in their own self-interest, trying
to increase or maintain the business they originate and presumably receive
credit for that business under their firms’ compensation systems. Ethical
fading theory might further suggest that general counsel’s use of language
euphemisms that invoke the adversary process allows them to recast the
conflict resolution process, moving it from an ethical frame (one focused on
lying as right or wrong) to a lawyering frame where spinning and shading
facts and highlighting or de-emphasizing other facts in the interests of
presenting the best case for your client—in this case the list lawyer him-
self—is understood to be expected and appropriate conduct.
In addition, ethical fading theory would posit that the fact that partners
on “the list” reportedly omit facts rather than making direct misstatements
blurs conceptions of responsibility. Cognitive psychology research indicates
that we tend to view acts of omission—even our own acts of omission—as
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id. at 226–27.
42. Id. at 228.
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less morally problematic than acts of commission.43 Acts of omission allow
the actor (the omitter) to shift moral blame from himself to the receiver of
the information who failed to follow up or ask the right questions. Because
general counsel have taken on the role of asking the right questions, they
appear to treat it as a case of “no ethical harm, no ethical foul.”
The fact that general counsel take on the responsibility for asking the
right questions to determine and resolve conflicts issues when list lawyers
are involved furthers the framing of the conflicts resolution process and the
conduct of the individuals involved as a lawyering issue, not an ethics issue.
In the adversary process lawyers on both sides have an obligation to thor-
oughly investigate the pertinent facts and then present the best version of
their cases, highlighting the good facts and de-emphasizing unfavorable
facts to the fact-finder. The fact-finder works to discover the truth in the
interplay between the two versions of the story. In the conflicts resolution
process, the list lawyer spins, shades, and omits relevant facts, but the “ad-
vocate” on the other side, the lawyer whose work for an existing or poten-
tial new client potentially conflicts, may not be in a position to investigate
the facts relating to the scope of the list-lawyer’s previous or proposed rep-
resentation. So general counsel take on the role of adversary and test the list
lawyer’s presentation of his case. The general counsel I interviewed seemed
confident that through aggressive questioning they are able to find the truth.
Ethical fading theory would argue that general counsel’s failure to view the
list lawyer’s shading, spinning, and omitting relevant facts as unethical rep-
resents ethical fading. The use of language euphemisms and adoption of
litigation-like strategies to address conflicts issues effectively allows gen-
eral counsel to avoid judging their colleagues as unethical, something con-
trary to their self-interest as the lawyers ostensibly responsible for ethics in
their firms. Instead, they frame their colleagues’ conduct as “lawyering.”
B. Ethical Learning—Advocacy in the Business of Large Law Firm
Practice
In contrast, ethical learning theory would argue that large firm general
counsel operate from a different and entirely appropriate set of ethical
benchmarks; and when viewed from those benchmarks, the list-lawyer’s
conduct is not unethical. General counsel’s perceptions of and judgments
about the conduct of the lawyers on the list are informed by their knowl-
edge of both the law governing lawyers and the nature of large law firm
practice.
All of the large firm general counsel I spoke with are experts on and
oversee the firm’s compliance with the relevant Rules of Professional Con-
duct. However, they do not generally view their roles as related to morality
43. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambigu-
ity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 263–64 (1990).
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or as promoting ethical behavior in a lay sense. They do not generally view
the Rules of Professional Conduct as statements of ethical or moral princi-
ples.  For example, a number of my general counsel interviewees describe
themselves as legal positivists with respect to the ethics rules. As such, they
view the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct as a political document
arrived at through the jockeying of interest groups, not declarations of right
and wrong. One general counsel’s comments are indicative:
I delivered a lecture at [a] law school on the intersection of ethics
and morality. I’m a legal positivist; I don’t think there is any
linkage. The morality is the morality of the system. It has to be
fair and just . . . . You have to find your own morality else-
where—because the rules are not a source. The Rules/The Model
Rules is [sic] a political document. There are interests involved in
its creation just like with any other legislation.
I bring morality to the job I do as a lawyer. I don’t overtly bring it
to my role as ethics partner. I view my role as ethics partner as
objective counselor—I don’t see myself as invoking morals.
Every now and then I’ll say “Why would you want to do that? Is
that really the approach you want to take here?” But that’s not my
day-to-day role.
People walk in every day and want counseling in the purest sense.
But that’s spiritual counsel, not ethics partnering. I don’t overtly
bring that kind of value judgment or view of professionalism into
my advice on nuts and bolts ethics issues—I’m rarely asked ques-
tions that implicate morality.44
In particular, general counsel generally view the rules governing con-
flicts of interest as political resolutions, not as expressions of right and
wrong. The vast majority of the general counsel I interviewed expressed the
belief that the ethics rules governing conflicts of interest are ill-suited to
address relationships between large firms and their sophisticated corporate
clients. They do not believe that their clients, Fortune 500 companies, need
the protection of the conflict rules.45 General counsel argue that their firms’
large corporate clients have armies of in-house lawyers who are capable of
determining whether a law firm’s current or prior representation of another
client will compromise the firm in its representation of their employer. In
addition, the large corporations that large law firms represent frequently are
involved in transactions and litigation that require highly specialized and
sophisticated legal services.46 There are limited numbers of lawyers and
firms qualified to do that work. In order to hire “the best” firm in a particu-
lar specialty, a company may be willing to engage a firm that has sued the
company in the past although the rules may prohibit waiver in those cir-
cumstances. The general counsel think their clients’ in-house lawyers are
44. Interview with General Counsel No. 3, supra note 21, at 34–35.
45. Kirkland, supra note 1, at 191.
46. Id. at 183.
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sufficiently informed and knowledgeable to make that choice and should be
permitted to do so. That said, across large law firms, general counsel spend
the bulk of their time addressing conflicts of interest and the professional
responsibility rules governing conflicts.
Thus, although they do not question that the conflicts rules may be
necessary to protect the interests of individuals and small entities, general
counsel dispute the contention that their large corporate clients need or want
the same protections. As a result, general counsel argue, and learning theory
might posit, that conflicts issues do not present ethical questions in the
sense that the rules do not delineate “right”—protecting the client’s inter-
ests—or “wrong”—endangering the client’s interests—in the context of
large firm practice.47 Although accurate information is necessary to deter-
mine the risk of taking on a given representation to the firm, because gen-
eral counsel do not see conflicts issues as involving or implicating
important ethical principles, they may not see truth-telling as necessary to
reach an ethical outcome in resolving the conflicts issue.
Further, homegrown general counsel characterize the list lawyers’ con-
duct as “lawyering.” They view the conflict resolution process as akin to the
litigation process, and in litigation a lawyers’ responsibility to the truth is a
far murkier concept. Lawyers are expected to present the best case for their
clients, emphasizing some facts and de-emphasizing others. Lawyers who
47. When conflicts issues arise, general counsel distinguish those situations that present
clear-cut conflicts from those where there is ambiguity about whether a representation would
violate the conflict rules. When it is not clear whether a conflict exists or can be waived, general
counsel and their firms frame the decision about whether to take on the new matter as a business
decision (i.e., they view the risk of being sanctioned or disqualified as potential business risks).
Consequently, general counsel and their firms treat these decisions as business decisions. Because
they frame many conflict issues as business decisions and see the rules as inappropriate and even
unfair in the context of their relationships with their corporate clients, they tend to treat decisions
about the firm’s course of action in cases where there is a clear conflict under the ethics rules as
compliance issues, not questions of right and wrong or morality.
That said, one general counsel who described himself as a positivist expressed the view that
there is a morality involved in following the rules of professional conduct:
Well I use the test “What would your mother say?” Come up with a position where
Mom would be pleased. Beyond this I’m a positivist—this is one set of rules—securities
firms have different rules—rules differ in different jurisdictions. The Code and Rules
are reasonable.
I think there is a morality involved in trying to comply with the rules, in not cheating.
That said, I’m not sure the Model Rules make the world a better place. There is some-
thing important about trying to comply honestly with whatever rules you accept.
The first analysis is compliance—you need to stay on the right side of the regulations.
Sometimes there is a discussion about what’s the right thing to do. But you only get to
that after compliance and business thinking.
Interview with General Counsel No. 12, at 23 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
However, even in this general counsel’s firm—in situations where what it means to comply
is ambiguous—the firm appears to frame compliance as a business decision: Do we do this “the
conservative way [or] the aggressive way,” (General Counsel No. 12) not as an ethical decision
(i.e., is it ethical to take on this business)? Thus, the decision is framed as a business decision,
requiring analysis of the business risks involved, and the lawyers in the firm in charge of business
decisions (which sometimes includes general counsel) decide whether to take the business risk.
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omit facts take a risk that the other side may bring those facts to light and
make the lawyer look like he was dishonest, but choosing to omit facts from
a presentation of one’s case in litigation is generally not seen as lying or
unethical.48 Because the majority of the general counsel I interviewed are
litigators, thinking about the intra-firm conflict resolution process as an ad-
versarial process is likely a natural mindset. In that context, the list-lawyers’
conduct in shading, spinning, and even omitting facts does not have the
ethical salience that it would outside of litigation.
Interestingly, that general counsel find it necessary to engage in adver-
sarial battle with the list lawyers adds credibility to their argument that the
conflict rules are not appropriate to large law firms. Partners in large law
firms with competitive compensation systems are dealing with partners on
the list who are advocating zealously for their clients against the interests of
their partners and, in some cases, against the interests of the firm itself. This
suggests that the incentive structures created in firms with competitive com-
pensation systems make it extremely unlikely that those partners would
compromise the interests of their clients in any way for the clients of other
partners in the firm.
Ethical learning theory would suggest that in this context, even if we
view the list-lawyer’s statements about the facts as lying to or intentionally
misleading general counsel about the scope of the firm’s representation of
their clients, their conduct has no ethical significance for the clients in-
volved. Thus, ethical learning theory might suggest that spinning, shading,
and omitting relevant facts is appropriate advocacy in the rough and tumble
internal market of today’s large law firms where partners are jockeying for
institutional support for their books of business.
C. Ethical Fading or Ethical Learning—Variations in the Views of
Homegrown and Outsider General Counsel
In contrast, based on his comments, it appears at least one of the out-
sider general counsel rejects this as the proper normative benchmark. This
outsider general counsel described the list-lawyers’ conduct as evidencing a
disrespect for the rule of law and viewed them as lacking integrity and
character. How do we account for the differences in the normative
benchmarks this outsider general counsel seems to be using and those the
majority of the homegrown general counsel I interviewed seem to adopt?
First, unlike the other general counsel I interviewed, this outsider general
counsel had never practiced as a litigator so he was probably less likely to
adopt an adversarial frame. In addition, because he did not grow up in the
48. In contrast, prosecutors have a duty to disclose (though not necessarily to “present” to a
jury) facts that may be detrimental to their cases. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.8(d) (2006); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutors have a duty to
disclose all material evidence to defendants).
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firm, he had not had the benefit of the ethical learning the homegrown gen-
eral counsel have had. Most large law firms’ general counsel have spent
their careers practicing in large firms. Overwhelmingly, they have spent the
majority of their careers in a single firm. My study included only two out-
sider general counsel, and their views may not even be representative of
that small group. As a result, there are limitations to the conclusions we can
draw from the variations in the homegrown and outsider general counsel’s
perceptions. However, my findings suggest some interesting hypotheses
and questions for further research.
Recognizing the limitations of this study, we can posit a number of
possible explanations for the differences in outsider and homegrown gen-
eral counsel perceptions of the ethics of large firm lawyers. First, this out-
sider may be wrong. He left his firm, and his less than favorable view of the
lawyers in his former firm may be unrelated to the list-lawyers’ conduct.
Second, it is possible that lawyers in the outsider general counsel’s firm
may have been less ethical or moral than the lawyers in the other firms I
studied. Third, the outsider general counsel was not a litigator so perhaps he
had no affinity for the adversarial framing the homegrown general counsel
adopt. In addition, this outsider general counsel grew up in corporations,
which were perhaps less internally competitive than today’s large law firms.
Perhaps in the corporations where he served as general counsel, the “rule of
law” was set by management and challenging that law was unacceptable. In
contrast, in at least some large law firms with competitive compensation
systems, internal competition and advocacy for resources and support is
expected and tolerated.
Alternatively, lawyers who shade, spin, and omit relevant facts may be
intentionally misleading their general counsel in discussions about potential
conflicts, and the homegrown general counsel may not be acknowledging
that reality. Because the homegrown general counsel have known many of
their partners for many years and likely have an affection for many of them,
it may be more difficult for them to view those colleagues’ actions in an
unbiased way or to judge them harshly. In other words, they may have
powerful social incentives to deceive themselves.
Even if we accept that the conflicts rules are not appropriate to large
law firms and their clients and therefore do not define ethical norms for
large firms, the list-lawyers’ conduct is contrary to the interests of the firm.
Although general counsel believe they effectively combat this tendency by
treating the list lawyers as adversaries, the fact that general counsel need to
do that with some partners and not others suggests that some partners ap-
proach the conflict discussion in a forthcoming manner and others do not.
Those who are not forthcoming are advocating for their self-interests over
the interests of one or more of their partners and possibly the interests of the
firm if it turns out that omitted facts were not disclosed and the firm fails to
comply with the ethics rules and is caught. Homegrown general counsel at
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firms with competitive compensation systems do not see this conduct as
evidence of a character flaw. Interestingly, however, many of the home-
grown general counsel seemed to focus on character flaws (as opposed to
institutional incentives) as the cause of lawyer wrongdoing. For example, in
discussing the causes of lawyer wrongdoing, one general counsel brought
up Eat What You Kill, the book by Milton Regan about John Gellene and
Milbank Tweed, the large New York law firm where he worked.49 In Eat
What You Kill, Regan suggests that Milbank Tweed’s compensation system
played a role in Gellene’s misconduct.50 This general counsel took issue
with Regan’s suggestion and insisted Gellene’s problems were the result of
a flawed character.
A little background about Gellene may be helpful here. Gellene was
convicted of perjury in connection with his work in a large commercial
bankruptcy case where he represented the debtor. Nine years earlier, the
firm discovered that although he had passed the New York and New Jersey
bar exams before he began a clerkship, Gellene had failed to submit the
paperwork necessary to be admitted to the N.Y. Bar and as a result had
been practicing at the firm without a license.51 The firm fired him but re-
hired him approximately a year later after he was admitted to the N.Y.
Bar.52 Two years later, Gellene was asked to lead a team representing a
company in a complex financial restructuring.53 The company had come to
the firm through one of the firm’s leading rainmaking partners, Robert Led-
erman.54 Gellene began work on the matter and after lengthy, often ac-
rimonius negotiations with one of its creditors, the company filed for
bankruptcy protection.55 As part of the bankruptcy process, Gellene and
Milbank asked to be appointed as counsel for the company, now the
“debtor” in the bankruptcy proceeding.56 To acquire approval to serve as
debtor’s counsel, Gellene and Milbank were required to disclose the firm’s
connections with any of the debtor’s creditors and any other party in inter-
est.57 The firm, in fact, had a significant connection to a party in interest
(another Lederman client), but Gellene failed to disclose that fact in the
disclosure affadavit he signed under oath.58
In Eat What You Kill, Regan suggests that Milbank’s “eat what you
kill” compensation system and the organizational pressures it created may
49. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL (2006).
50. See id. at 6–7 (citing specifically the shift from job security to merit-based
compensation).
51. Id. at 60.
52. Id. at 61–62.
53. Id. at 15–16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 97–135.
56. Id. at 2. For more detail on these negotiations, see id. at 97–135.
57. Id. at 2–3. For more detail, see id. at 148–72.
58. Id. at 3. For more detail, see id. at 148–72.
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have played a role in Gellene’s wrongdoing.59 The general counsel who
raised Gellene as an example had knowledge of the Gellene matter, includ-
ing Gellene’s early history at Milbank Tweed, and expressed disbelief about
Regan’s suggestion that Gellene’s actions in the bankruptcy case were
spurred by institutional pressures:
I thought Mitt Regan was wrong about why Gellene did what he
did. Gellene’s problem was a paperwork problem, if the
paperwork was hard or unpleasant he would put it in a drawer.  I
don’t think John Gellene was driven by business issues to do what
he did.60
In a later interview, another homegrown general counsel described
what he referred to as the “lone wolf problem.” General counsel use the
terms “lone wolves” and lawyers with “silo practices” to refer to partners
who work exclusively for one or a few clients who do not otherwise engage
the firm’s services. A lawyer with a silo practice therefore has an exclusive
relationship with those clients; the only other firm lawyers who work with
the client are those junior lawyers the silo partner decides to bring on and
supervise. I asked whether he saw John Gellene as an example of a lone
wolf. He characterized Gellene as a lone wolf but attributed Gellene’s mis-
conduct to a character flaw and a lack of monitoring rather than to institu-
tional pressure to generate revenues.
Question: How do you account for what happened at
Millbank with John Gellene? Is he an example of a lone wolf?
I was talking to a client about [John Gellene and Milbank Tweed]
recently—he was fascinated by it. We talked about Mitt Regan’s
book Eat What You Kill.  I think personally, he (Mitt) got it
wrong . . . .
Gellene’s problem was a lone wolf problem—but I don’t think
Gellene gave a damn about money. It wasn’t about Eat What You
Kill—it was that he was off on his own. He was a brilliant, driven
guy but you knew this problem was coming from the first inci-
dent. Not that I don’t believe in redemption, but I went to Catho-
lic school and it’s my sense that if you steal small, you’ll steal
big, if you lie small, you’ll lie big. You either have the character
or you don’t. If he were here he’d have been gone after the first
incident.
We had exactly the same thing happen to us (before my time) and
he (the guy) was history. [It was a] precise parallel even to the
point where the way people talked about it here was the same way
that they talked about Gellene at Milbank. At Milbank people
said, “He lied to Alexander Volcher!” (Volcher was the Chair of
Milbank for many years)—it was like lying to God. [Volcher]
looked like God: he was 6’3”, he had white hair.  It’s the same
59. Id. at 50. For more detail, see id. at 291–95.
60. Interview with General Counsel No. 3, supra note 21, at 29.
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thing I heard here. People were more shocked that he had lied to
[our Chair], then the second thing—that he sent a false affidavit
to the Bar.
The fellow who did it here pled to a tax violation ten or so years
ago.  Long after he left us. [Our Chair] used to criticize me for
being too moralistic but I believe if you steal small, you’ll steal
big; if you cheat [the firm] on overtime, you’ll cheat a client.61
This general counsel was describing what ethical learning theory calls
“slippery slope decision-making.”62 The “slippery slope” refers to a first
small step over an ethical line that creates a new ethical norm within an
organization. From the new ethical line, small steps can take an organiza-
tional actor further and further from the organization’s original ethical
norms. Past practices often define the norm within organizations. Because
in the slippery slope scenario the steps beyond a past practice are small,
they can be taken without raising an ethical “hew and cry,” notwithstanding
that practices may now be very different from when someone took the first
step over the ethical line.63
When considering Gellene, this general counsel seems to acknowledge
the dangers of the slippery slope. However, he does not appear to do the
same with the partners on “the list.” He describes the list lawyers in his firm
as “spinning” and “shading” facts and reports that they “omit relevant
facts,” but he does not appear to view this conduct as “lying small”; nor
does he treat it as an indication that these lawyers may at some point “lie
big.”64 He does not appear to see the lawyers’ conduct as the first step down
the slippery slope. Perhaps for this general counsel, the ethical line has
moved and spinning, shading, and omitting relevant facts is now the norm.
In addition, this general counsel expressed the view that the firm’s failure,
if any, was the failure to get rid of Gellene after the first incident. In this
general counsel’s view, the failure was not the pressures of Milbank’s eat
what you kill compensation system.
In contrast, one of the two outsider general counsel I interviewed had a
very different perception. Regan’s interpretation resonated with this out-
sider general counsel’s experience:
61. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 32–34 (emphasis added).
62. See Darley, supra note 4, at 1184–85; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 228–29.
63. Tenbrunsel and Messick cite one of a number of similar examples from the business
world—the case of Kurzweil Applied Intelligence, Inc. and its Co-CEO Bernard Bradstreet. In
order to improve the company’s financial profile as he tried to prepare it to go public, Bradstreet
allowed sales to be posted a day or two in advance of the time the deal was actually signed in
order to meet quarterly revenue targets. Over time, sales reps began to post sales weeks in advance
of the actual sale; and by the end, some sales reps were forging signatures on sales contracts. A
small step over the ethical line led to small steps beyond that new norm until, in the end, the
company was engaging in outright fraud. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 228–29.
64. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 32.
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In Eat What You Kill, [Regan] captured it perfectly. The pressures
struck a chord with me. It was exactly what I saw.65
And later, the same general counsel said:
I thought [Regan] did it well in Eat What You Kill. He got the
nuances. In Eat What You Kill, it was the junior partner who went
to jail. The younger partners know what the powerful partner
wants them to do—they don’t have to tell them that—that’s, that
skill is what is rewarded in large firms and in law schools. It
doesn’t always have to do with ethics. But they don’t have to tell
them what they want them to do.66
Both of the homegrown general counsel who talked about Gellene ac-
knowledged  the fact that many law firm compensation systems reward
origination, and, as a result, a lawyer’s compensation is often on the line
when conflict issues arise. However, when they discussed the Gellene mat-
ter and Regan’s thesis that the institutional structure and ensuing incentives
and pressures of Milbank Tweed’s compensation system played a role in his
misconduct, both general counsel rejected the system as a cause. Instead,
they attributed Gellene’s unethical behavior to a character flaw.
These general counsels’ attribution of Gellene’s problems to a charac-
ter flaw was particularly interesting in light of general counsels’ reports
about statistics collected by malpractice insurers that show a correlation be-
tween firms’ compensation systems and firm risk profiles. One general
counsel explained, “The liability insurers will tell you the closer you are to
a ‘lock step’ compensation system, the safer your profile. The closer you
are to an ‘eat what you kill’ system the riskier the profile—the greater the
number of claims.”67
Later, the same general counsel reiterated the point:
AON68 will tell you there is a direct correlation between competi-
tive compensation systems and the number of claims filed against
firms. You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to know if you eat
what you kill, it encourages you to take risks that are greater.69
Confirming this reality, a general counsel from a lock-step compensa-
tion firm reported that he uses the fact that his firm employs a lock-step
compensation system to negotiate better rates with the firm’s insurers.70
However, the general counsel who mentioned the AON statistics was
the same general counsel who expressed the view that the Milbank’s fail-
ure, if any, was the failure to get rid of Gellene after the first incident. In
65. Interview with General Counsel No. 10, supra note 35, at 2.
66. Id.
67. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 38.
68. AON Corporation is the second largest insurance broker and the largest provider of pro-
fessional liability insurance for attorneys in the world.
69. Interview with General Counsel No. 4, supra note 2, at 43.
70. Interview with General Counsel No. 8, at 3 (2007–2008) (on file with author).
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this general counsel’s view the failure was not the pressures of Milbank’s
eat what you kill compensation system. Although both of the general coun-
sel who discussed Gellene at length were familiar with the story of what
happened, neither accounted for the two other lawyers at Milbank who,
according to Regan’s research, participated in discussions about whether to
disclose the firm’s relationship with a creditor. On one occasion in a meet-
ing with Gellene and Robert Lederman, the rainmaking partner who had the
relationship with both the debtor and Salovaara (the ‘other party in inter-
est’), Toni Lichstein, a junior partner on the team, questioned whether the
firm needed to disclose the relationship with Salovaara.71  Lichstein revis-
ited the issue with Gellene and Lederman separately after the affidavit was
first filed.72 According to Regan’s research, Gellene told Lichstein disclo-
sure was not required, and Gellene did not disclose.73 Lederman apparently
took steps to have another firm take over representation of Salovaara in an
ongoing matter, but apparently did not take steps to have Gellene amend his
affidavit to disclose the relationship.74 Thus, according to Regan, Gellene’s
failure to disclose was not the act of a single individual with a flawed
character.
Presumably all of the general counsel I interviewed are familiar with
the statistics that demonstrate a correlation between claims against the firm
and competitive compensation systems, but only the general counsel who
reported that their firms used lock-step compensation systems focused pri-
marily on the influence of the compensation system on lawyer ethics when
asked about the causes of lawyer wrongdoing.
D. Ethical Fading or Ethical Learning—General Counsel’s Perceptions
of the Role of Compensation Systems in Lawyer Conduct
Ethical fading theory suggests that self-deception is enabled by our
erroneous assessments or assumptions about the causes of ethical failures.75
Tenbrunsel and Messick identify three types of perceptual errors that lead
us to misplace moral responsibility for ethical failures.76 First, when we ask
why ethical failures happen, we tend to focus on people rather than sys-
tems.77 We assume that systems are error proof, and, as a result, we assign
blame to people rather than to system failures.78 Tenbrunsel and Messick
conducted a study that demonstrated how a system can cause ethical fail-
ures. In their study, they introduced a weak monitoring system to detect
71. REGAN, supra note 49, at 146.
72. Id. at 155–56.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 229–31.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id.
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undesirable behavior.79 They found that undesirable behavior was more
prevalent among the subjects who were made aware of the presence of a
weak monitoring system than among subjects who were not told about the
monitoring system.80 But Tenbrunsel and Messick’s research indicates that,
notwithstanding the evidence that systems sometimes cause undesirable be-
havior, systems are rarely blamed.81
Second, Tenbrunsel and Messick argue that self-interest affects our
perceptions about the cause of ethical failures.82 For instance, studies indi-
cate we often assign causal significance to factors we see as mutable and
underplay the causal significance of what we view as immutable factors.
So, in the above example, if a system is believed to be immutable and
human beings are viewed as mutable, we may attribute causal influence to
the people instead of the system. Tenbrunsel and Messick suggest that self-
interest can affect our assessment of which factors are mutable; we may be
more likely to perceive a factor as mutable if doing so would deflect
blame.83
Both of the homegrown general counsel who thought Gellene’s
problems were the result of his flawed character suggested that Gellene
would have been terminated after the first incident at their firms. In their
view, Milbank’s mistake was failing to get rid of a bad apple,84 not
Milbank’s eat what you kill compensation system. Both of these general
counsel worked in firms that used competitive compensation systems. Ethi-
cal fading theory would suggest the presence of bad apple behavior is a
mutable factor in the minds of these general counsel because they think
they can effectively detect and check bad apple behavior in the conflict
resolution process. They likely view the system of incentives and rewards
in their firms as, practically speaking, entirely immutable.85 Moreover, con-
sistent with this thinking as general counsel have developed their roles, one
of their primary functions—their raison d’etre—is to act as a check on the
bad apples by approaching them like skeptical litigators when dealing with
conflicts issues.
In contrast, ethical learning theory might argue that far from an error in
perceptual causation, these general counsel are absolutely correct that large
law firms will not get rid of competitive compensation systems in order to
79. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems: Decision Frames, and
Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 689–93 (1999).
80. Id. at 693.
81. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 229.
82. Id. at 230.
83. Id.
84. Darley, supra note 4, at 1178 (referring to and critiquing the prevalence of “bad apple”
theorizing among conventional explanations for recent cases of corruption among U.S.
corporations).
85. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 4, at 230; see also supra text accompanying notes
81–82.
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reduce list-lawyers’ incentives to spin, shade, and omit relevant facts in the
conflict resolution process or to void Gellene-like failures to disclose. Over
the last thirty years, the vast majority of large law firms that employed lock-
step compensation systems have abandoned those systems.86 They made
these changes to gain competitive advantage in the market place. Because
most of the corporations large law firms represent are no longer loyal to one
law firm, using it for all of their legal needs, firms need rainmaking partners
who can attract and keep lucrative clients. For firms to retain these rainmak-
ing partners, they need to pay them according to the value of the revenues
they bring to the firm rather than by seniority. Thus, ethical learning theory
would posit that general counsel are correct that their firms’ compensation
systems are immutable and that they need to expend their energies on de-
tecting and checking the flawed characters who will put their self-interest
ahead of the interest of the firm in that environment. All of which, leads us
back to where we started—is the fact that homegrown general counsel do
not appear to view the list lawyers as ethically flawed characters a sign of
ethical fading or an indication of ethical learning?
I do not know that I am in any better a position to make that judgment
than you, the reader. However, I am suggesting that if any of us are to make
normative judgments about lawyers’ ethics based on empirical data, we
must employ a deliberative approach.87 As empiricists we must present and
examine our data through these competing narrative lenses (ethical fading
versus ethical learning), allowing ourselves to “inhabit” each in order to
examine the alternatives with both sympathy (i.e., a belief that it is accu-
rate) and detachment (a healthy skepticism for the story being told). Only a
clear-eyed and compassionate presentation of the data provides a basis for
the nuanced deliberation required to make judgments about lawyers’ ethics.
86. REGAN, supra note 49, at 36.
87. Anthony T. Kronman suggests such an approach for the making of judgments generally
in Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 850–54 (1987).
